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In this paper we analyze the relationship between social networks and the job
search behavior of unemployed individuals. It is believed that networks convey use-
ful information in the job search process such that individuals with larger networks
should experience a higher productivity of informal search. Hence, job search theory
suggests that individuals with larger networks use informal search channels more often
and substitute from formal to informal search. Due to the increase in search produc-
tivity, it is also likely that individuals set higher reservation wages. We analyze these
relations using a novel data set of unemployed individuals in Germany containing ex-
tensive information on job search behavior and direct measures for the social network
of individuals. Our ﬁndings conﬁrm theoretical expectations. Individuals with larger
networks use informal search channels more often and shift from formal to informal
search. We ﬁnd that informal search is mainly considered a substitute for passive,
less cost intensive search channels. In addition to that, we ﬁnd evidence for a positive
relationship between the network size and reservation wages.
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Social networks are an important source of information in the labor market and many
workers ﬁnd jobs through friends and relatives. Seminal studies by Rees (1966) and Gra-
novetter (1995) show that a considerable part of the working population relies on personal
contacts to obtain information about job oﬀers. According to a recent study by Franzen
and Hangartner (2006) around 44% of the workers in the U.S. and 34% of the workers in
Germany have found their jobs through social networks.1 The widespread use of informal
search channels has given rise to an extensive body of literature investigating the eﬀect of
networks and informal search on labor market outcomes.
One reasonable assumption is that informal job contacts reduce informational asym-
metry by lowering uncertainty about the job match quality for both, employees and the
employers (see, e.g., Montgomery, 1991). In terms of labor market outcomes, this mecha-
nism should lead to higher wages and longer job tenures. However, the empirical evidence
is rather mixed. In particular, it has been found that informal search success can be as-
sociated with a premium as well as with a penalty in terms of wages and employment
stability (compare, e.g., Ioannides and Datcher Loury, 2004 and Mouw, 2003 for extensive
overviews). More recent studies focus on the quality of the information transmitted via the
network. It is argued that the productivity of the network is determined by the character-
istics of individuals composing the network, and it is expected that the employment status
of individuals within a network are correlated with each other (compare Calvo-Armengol
and Jackson, 2007).2
A related strand of literature analyzes job search outcomes by explicitly modeling the
job search process. As individuals tend to use several sources of information during job
search, particular attention is paid to the choice of search channels and its impact on
labor market outcomes (see e.g. Holzer, 1988, van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006
and Weber and Mahringer, 2008). Based on theoretical job search models with diﬀerential
search channels, these studies derive implications from changes in productivity or costs
of search on the search channel choice, search intensity, and corresponding labor market
outcomes.
In this paper we link directly observable information on social networks to the job
search behavior of the unemployed. In contrast to previous studies focusing on the eﬀect
of informal search on realized search outcomes, we explicitly study the eﬀect of the extent
of networks on the choices individuals make in the job search process. This approach allows
us to shed some light into the “black box” of the interplay between social networks and
the job search choices of individuals, which has to date received little attention in the
literature. If the assumption that networks convey relevant job-information holds, it is
likely that well-connected individuals receive more job oﬀers through their network than
1These numbers are based on the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2001.
2However, the corresponding data requirements in terms of the quality of the individual network are
high and usually not met in conventional survey data. Therefore, some studies approximate the network
quality, for example, with the characteristics of the neighborhood of the individuals (see, e.g., Topa, 2001
and Bayer, Ross, and Topa, 2008). See Cappellari and Tatsiramos (2010) for a recent empirical analysis
with directly observed network quality.
2individuals with lower levels of social contacts. In turn, if networks do play a role in the
job search process, it is expected that individuals adjust their search behavior contingent
on the network they possess. For this purpose, we distinguish between two diﬀerent search
channels: formal and informal search. Formal search is deﬁned as search by newspaper
advertisements, internet, public employment oﬃce, etc., while informal search refers to
search via friends and relatives. We discuss potential eﬀects of network size on job search
eﬀorts and reservation wages within a theoretical framework that is closely related to
the studies of van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006), Holzer (1988), and Weber and
Mahringer (2008).
Our empirical analysis is based on the IZA Evaluation Data Set (see Caliendo et
al., 2010, for details). This unique data set consists of around 17,000 individuals who
had become unemployed between late 2007 and early 2008. The data provide detailed
information on search behavior, social networks and diﬀerent psychological traits including
locus of control. Hence, the data allow us to observe the job search process of unemployed
in detail, i.e., the types of search channels they use, their intensity of search, as well as
their reservation wage. In our analysis we link these variables to social network indicators,
measured by the number of close friends and the contact frequency to former colleagues.
The set up of our data has several advantages allowing a direct analysis of the rela-
tion between networks and job search choices. First of all, the interviews were conducted
around seven weeks after entering unemployment. The fact that all individuals are in-
terviewed at a very early point in time during their unemployment spell, reduces the
problem of potential reverse causality, which is a typical concern of studies on the rela-
tionship between concepts like social networks or non-cognitive skills and labor market
outcomes.3 Another concern is that the size of the network might be correlated with un-
observed heterogeneity which simultaneously has an impact on the job search behavior. In
order to control for this potential omitted variable bias we exploit a rather informative set
of observable characteristics including personality traits, previous labor market outcomes
and other socio-demographic characteristics of the individual. Given this unusually rich
set of individual information, exploring the relationship between networks and job search
behavior conditional on observable characteristics seems to be a reasonable strategy. As
mentioned above, recent research has stressed the importance of observing the quality of
the network in explaining the heterogenous impact of social networks on labor market
outcomes. Since we do not observe the quality of the network, i.e., we do not have any
information on labor market characteristics of friends or colleagues, we cannot deduce
whether the network of friends is likely to convey helpful information for the unemployed.
However, if individuals decide to use informal search channels, the assumption that larger
networks convey more information is still likely to hold, independent of the network qual-
ity. For the interpretation of the results it is important to note that the measured impact
captures only one dimension, the size of a network.
Our results show that search behavior is indeed inﬂuenced by the presence of social
3Alternatively, one could model the interdependencies between network formation and employment
dynamics explicitly, see for example Bramoulle and Saint-Paul (2010). For this approach one needs panel
data in order to explore individual variation over time.
3contacts. In particular, we ﬁnd evidence that individuals with larger networks substitute
informal search at the cost of formal search eﬀort. This is especially the case for passive
formal search methods, i.e., informational sources that generate rather unspeciﬁc types of
job oﬀers at low relative costs. In line with the predictions of the theoretical model, we also
ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects of an increase in the network size on reservation wages.
Our results further show the importance of including personality traits, e.g., openness and
extraversion, in the analysis of social networks. Once we control for personality traits, the
impact of our network indicators on the use of formal search model gets stronger, while
the impact on reservation wages gets weaker.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 summarizes some related literature on
job search choices of individuals. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework from which
we derive our testable implications. Section 4 describes the IZA Evaluation Data Set in
more detail, speciﬁes the sampling strategy for the estimation sample and motivates the
choices of the network information used. In Section 5 we present our estimation strategy
as well as the results; Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous Empirical Findings
Many studies have shown that unemployed workers use multiple channels of job search
and that the majority of unemployed workers makes use of informal channels (compare
for evidence from diﬀerent European countries, Pellizzari, 2010). In the standard partial
job search model with endogenous search eﬀort, unemployed individuals use one general
search channel and choose an optimal search eﬀort s∗ and a reservation wage φ in order
to maximize their utility (see, e.g., Mortensen, 1986). The reservation wage deﬁnes the
“stopping rule” and corresponds to the wage oﬀer for which the present value of ongoing
search equals the present value of accepting the wage oﬀer, i.e., every wage oﬀer above φ
will be accepted. In the analysis of job search with multiple search channels it is assumed
that the choice of a particular search channel and the channel-speciﬁc search eﬀort is
determined by the relative eﬃciency of that channel in generating acceptable job oﬀers.4
An early example for a study on the determinants of the choice of search methods
and its eﬀectiveness is Holzer (1988). Using a sample of unemployed youths—who are
interviewed at diﬀerent points in time during their unemployment spell—he ﬁnds that the
main determinants of search channel use are the relative costs in terms of time spent on
a particular channel for generating job oﬀers and acceptances. Blau and Robins (1990)
also analyze job search choices and outcomes, emphasizing the diﬀerences between search
of unemployed and employed individuals. As in Holzer (1988), they ﬁnd heterogeneous
job oﬀer arrival and acceptance rates for the diﬀerent channels. However, as they do
not observe the channel speciﬁc search eﬀort, they are not able to identify whether the
diﬀerential success rates are explained by diﬀerential eﬀectiveness of these search channels
or by diﬀerential use. More recently, Weber and Mahringer (2008) conducted a similar
4For a theoretical equilibrium analysis on the eﬀects of formal and informal search on labor market
outcomes see, e.g., Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994). In their model they provide a rationale for workers
with a higher probability of obtaining job oﬀers through employed contacts earning more in equilibrium.
4analysis, looking at the job search choices of newly employed workers in Austria. In line
with the previous studies they ﬁnd that contacting friends is one of the most often used
search methods that is also most eﬀective in terms of successful job oﬀers. Furthermore,
they provide evidence that the success of a search channel is indeed highly heterogenous
across individual characteristics such as education and labor market attachment. However,
very few of these characteristics inﬂuence the success probability of informal search, which
suggests that the wide spread use of informal search is driven by its high relative eﬃciency.
It has to be noted, however, that none of these studies investigates correlations between
network indicators and the choice of job search methods. An example for a study analyzing
the impact of the social networks on job search channels and search outcomes is Wahba and
Zenou (2005). They use population density as a proxy for the size of social networks and
ﬁnd—based on cross-sectional data for Egypt—that the probability to ﬁnd a job through
friends and relatives increases and is concave in population density. Mouw (2003) explicitly
considers the relationship between speciﬁc network characteristics and the use of informal
search channels. However, he does not ﬁnd any evidence for a positive relationship between
the “quality” of a network, e.g., the proportion of friends in similar jobs, and the use of
informal search channels.
A structural analysis on the diﬀerences between formal and informal search is con-
ducted by Koning, van den Berg, and Ridder (1997). In their analysis, they ﬁnd no evi-
dence for diﬀerences in the wage oﬀer distributions between formal and informal search
channels, but discover an increased exit rate from unemployment for the use of informal
channels compared to formal channels. However, they do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect for
a social network indicator—reﬂecting the number of friends—on the exit rate from un-
employment to employment via informal channels. Based on a social experiment, van den
Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) show in the context of active labor market policies that
unemployed workers shift from informal search eﬀort to formal eﬀort if they are monitored
on their formal search level. They ﬁnd evidence that these one-sided monitoring activities
may lead to ineﬃcient substitution eﬀects, especially for well-qualiﬁed individuals.
In summary, these studies indicate that the choices of speciﬁc search channels are
indeed driven by cost-beneﬁt considerations. Accordingly, if the hypothesis that social
networks give access to additional information holds, it should be the case that individu-
als with higher levels of networks experience a higher productivity of their informal search
channel and thus adjust their job search behavior. In the following, we discuss the theo-
retical implications of an exogenous increase in size of social networks on the individual
choice of search channels, corresponding search eﬀort, and the reservation wage.
3 Theoretical Framework
Our framework is closely related to the theoretical model of job search with endogenous
search eﬀort and two search channels by van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006). We focus
on a sequential and stationary model of job search with two search channels, formal (f) and
informal (n). An unemployed worker chooses optimal levels of formal search eﬀort sf and
informal search eﬀort sn, the sum of both equals the overall search eﬀort s, s = sf+sn. Each
5search channel has a channel speciﬁc job oﬀer arrival rate λi,i = f,n that is a function
of the search eﬀort devoted to it. We assume that the job oﬀer arrival rate is strictly
concave in search eﬀort for both search channels. The productivity of informal search
depends positively on the size of the network. The job oﬀer arrival rate from informal
search λn(sn,n) is given by λn0(sn)f(n). f(n) increases in the magnitude of the network
n,
∂f(n)
∂n > 0, and is multiplied with the “baseline” arrival rate which depends positively
on search eﬀort sn. Furthermore there is a cost c of search that increases with the search
eﬀort invested. We assume that c = c(sn,sf) is convex in sn and sf. An assumption that is
commonly made in the literature is that the cross-partial derivative of the cost-function is
greater than zero, i.e., ∂2c/(∂(sf)∂(sn)) > 0.5 This reﬂects that formal and informal search
are similar activities which implies that marginal costs for informal search are higher the
more time one invests in formal search and vice versa.
The timing of the model is as follows. In each period of length dt, the individual receives
a job oﬀer with probability (λf +λn)dt. Each oﬀer is characterized by a wage w, randomly
drawn from the wage oﬀer distribution F(w), which is the same for both search channels. If
an individual receives an oﬀer, he has to decide whether to accept it or continue searching.
If he accepts the oﬀer, his utility will be equal to the present value Ve(w) of working at
wage w. His present value of continued search given his expectations of future job oﬀers is
Vu, which is also dependent on the utility the individual receives from being unemployed
b and the cost endured by search. In order to maximize his utility the worker will continue
searching until Ve(w) ≥ Vu. It can be shown that the individual is indiﬀerent between
both choices if the wage oﬀer w is equal to his reservation wage φ = ρVu, where ρ denotes
the rate of discount. Hence, in each period the worker maximizes his current and expected
utility by choosing a reservation wage and an optimal amount of search eﬀort in each
search channel. The maximization problem is given by:
max
sn,sf






From the ﬁrst order conditions it follows that in optimum the individual will choose
the amount of search eﬀort in each channel that equates the expected marginal returns
and the marginal costs of search. Based on these optimality conditions we are interested
in the impact of an increase of the network size n on the optimal levels of the reservation
wage φ and the search eﬀorts sf and sn. We assume that the network size is determined
exogenously to the unemployment spell and that it enters the optimization problem only
via a change in the job arrival rate of the informal search channel. As mentioned above,
the set up of this model is very similar to the one discussed in van den Berg and van der
Klaauw (2006). In their theoretical model, counseling by the caseworkers facilitates search
along the formal channel. They are interested in the eﬀects of a change in the amount of
counseling on the job search behavior and derive —under several reasonable assumptions—
testable implications which we can directly adopt to our model. In particular they assume
channel substitutability and show that an increase in the amount of counseling increases
5Note, that the implications of this assumption are equivalent to the implications of the assumption
that the cross-partial derivative of a joint production function is negative.
6the reservation wage and the eﬀort spent on formal search, while the unemployed reduce
the eﬀort for informal search (see van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006, for a detailed
proof). In our setting this implies that we expect individuals with a larger network to
have a higher reservation wage (∂φ/∂n > 0), a positive impact of the network size on
informal search (∂sn/∂n > 0) and a negative impact on the eﬀort spent on formal search
(∂sf/∂n < 0).
Intuitively, an increase in network size leads to an increase in the overall search pro-
ductivity, which leads—for a given amount of search eﬀort—to an increase in the value
of search. The present value of unemployment increases, which implies an increase of the
reservation wage. However, as the reservation wage increases, the marginal expected ben-
eﬁt of search is going to decrease. This indirect negative eﬀect hence dampens the positive
eﬀect of a productivity increase on the reservation wage, although the overall change is
expected to be positive (compare van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006). Faced with
diﬀerent values of continued search depending on the size of their network, individuals
optimally allocate their search eﬀort devoted to formal and informal search. In particular,
for the case of substitutable or independent search channels, an increase in informal search
productivity leads—for a given amount of overall search eﬀort—to a redistribution from
the eﬀort spent on formal search to the eﬀort spent on informal search. In the case of sub-
stitutable channels the substitution eﬀect is reinforced by the fact that the marginal costs
of search increase with the other respective channel. If the cost functions are independent
of one another, i.e., if the cross derivatives are zero, this reinforcing eﬀect is missing, which
weakens the substitution eﬀect. In both cases however, it is expected that informal search
intensity increases and formal search intensity decreases. Alternatively, one could think of
the case with complementary productivity (or costs) of search channels. This would imply
that an increase in the search intensity in one search channel leads to an increase in the
marginal productivity of the other search channel. In this case it is more diﬃcult to draw
unambiguous conclusions about the diﬀerent eﬀects (see, e.g., Holzer, 1988, for theoretical
implications of varying cross-dependencies between search channel productivities). In any
case one would not expect to observe a substitution of search intensities if the productivity
increase in formal search is at least as high as for informal search.6
4 Dataset, Search Behavior and Social Networks
4.1 The IZA Evaluation Data Set
We test the hypothesis of our model empirically, using observable characteristics of the
individual’s network as an indicator for the eﬃciency of search via the informal search
channel. The data we use are drawn from the IZA Evaluation Data Set that consists of
an inﬂow sample into unemployment from June 2007 to May 2008. The data set is based
on two components, an administrative part which contains extensive information on past
6In their paper, van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) also argue that their results only hold as long
as the productivity increase induced by counseling is larger for the case of formal search than for informal
search.
7labor market experience, and a survey part. The key feature of the survey data is that
individuals are interviewed shortly after they become unemployed. They are asked general
questions about their socio-demographic background, their employment history, as well as
a variety of non-standard questions about attitudes, expectations, and personality traits
(see Caliendo et al., 2010, for details).7 The sampling of the data is restricted to individuals
who are 17 to 54 years old, and who receive or are eligible to receive unemployment
beneﬁts under the German Social Code III. From the monthly unemployment inﬂows of
approximately 206,000 individuals in the administrative records, a 9% random sample
is drawn which constitutes the gross sample. Out of this gross sample each month a
representative sample of approximately 1,450 individuals is interviewed, so that after one
year 12 monthly cohorts are gathered. Altogether, this amounts to a total of 17,396 realized
interviews with an average time lag of seven weeks between the unemployment registration
and the interview.
In the empirical analysis, we estimate the eﬀects of social networks on the search behav-
ior of newly unemployed workers. We therefore restrict the sample to individuals who are
still unemployed when interviewed and who are actively searching for employment. That
is, we exclude individuals who have found a job already, who search for self-employment
or who do not search for other reasons. We also exclude individuals who are below the age
of 25 and who state that they are looking for both an apprenticeship and employment. In
order to get comparable individuals in terms of their network composition, we further ex-
clude individuals who state that they did not have colleagues in some earlier employment
relationship. From this preliminary sample of about 9,400 individuals, we further exclude
the lowest and highest percentile of the reported hourly reservation wage and the search
intensity as well as individuals with missing values for any key variables. This leaves us
with a sample of 7,953 individuals.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the estimation sample. The average unem-
ployed person in our sample is 36 years old and equally likely to be male or female. Also,
68% of the unemployed live in West Germany with 5% not having German citizenship.
Comparing these sample ﬁgures with oﬃcial unemployment data in Germany, it can be
seen that the sample selection process did not aﬀect the representativeness of our sample
(compare Bundesagentur f¨ ur Arbeit, 2007). Regarding the education level, the majority of
individuals have a medium level high school degree8, and 72% have completed at most some
type of professional training9. Before entering unemployment the majority of individuals
was in regular employment (67%). Additionally, the data contain information on person-
ality traits such as the “locus of control” (compare, e.g., Rotter, 1966), which constitutes
7For those individuals who gave us their permission we are able to link the survey data with admin-
istrative records based on the ‘Integrated Labour Market Biographies’ of the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB), containing relevant register data from four sources: employment history, unemployment
support recipience, participation in active labor market programs, and job seeker history.
8The lower secondary education system in Germany is divided into three parallel tracks (dubbed
“low”,“medium” or “high”), providing prerequisites for the post-secondary vocational system in either
work- or school-based vocational training or tertiary education, respectively.
9This corresponds to ”post-secondary non-tertiary education” at ISCED level 4.
8a measure for the individual’s feeling of internal and external reinforcement. Individuals
are located between these two opposing poles, the former indicating that an individual
feels that events in his or her life are inﬂuenced deterministically by his or her decisions,
while the latter indicates the belief that these events are purely inﬂuenced by external
factors such as luck or fate. It is generally found that individuals with a more internal
locus of control fare better in terms of their labor market outcomes, see, e.g., Andrisani
(1977) or Osborne Groves (2005). Further dimensions of the individuals personality traits
that are included in the regression are measures capturing openness, conscientiousness,
extraversion, and neuroticism. A large array of literature has shown that non-cognitive
skills and personality traits have predictive power in models on labor market outcomes
(see Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, and Weel, 2008, for an overview). Therefore it will
be important to control for them later in our empirical analysis.
4.2 Deﬁning Social Networks
For our analysis we are interested in exogenously determined networks that individuals
might employ in order to get relevant information in the labor market. In particular, it is
required that the network size or strength is not aﬀected by the current unemployment
spell. In general, several endogeneity issues might arise that have to be considered when
using network parameters in job search equations.
In case of a dynamic endogenous selection process, the network of the unemployed is
aﬀected by the unemployment spell or the unemployment duration. First of all, it might
be the case that the network of relevant social contacts is diminished in the course of
unemployment, as the change in circumstances leads to the dissolution of some ties. This
implies a potential problem of reverse causality, as the unemployment spell causes a change
in network size. As argued above, we expect that the set-up of the data prevents this type
of selection as individuals are all interviewed at a similar point in time relative to their
entry into unemployment. Since interviews were conducted shortly after the beginning of
the unemployment spell, we also expect that any eﬀects on network composition are rather
small. Another type of dynamic endogeneity is characterized by individuals strategically
increasing their social network in order to increase the probability of receiving informal job
information (compare, e.g., Galeotti and Merlino, 2008). In terms of our job search model,
this would imply that the measure of informal search eﬀort should additionally capture
the eﬀort devoted to the enlargement of the social network. However, as this is also linked
to the magnitude of the network that the individuals had before entering unemployment,
it is diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀects of the pre-existing and the “new” network on the
job search process. In order to avoid this problem, we restrict our analysis to networks
that had already been established before individuals entered unemployment and that were
presumably not altered in the course of unemployment.
In the context of job search, the most relevant information on networks contained in
our data are the questions regarding the existence of friends and colleagues. Clearly, these
two groups of contacts are not conclusive in depicting the social network of individuals as a
whole and should be seen as an approximation. We will focus on these two types of networks
9for two reasons: First, they are very likely to convey potentially relevant job information
which makes them relevant for our analysis. Second, we are able to extract information that
is not likely inﬂuenced by the entry into unemployment, helping to avoid the endogeneity
problems mentioned before. In particular, we will approximate the network of friends
by the number of “close” friends as it is not probable that many close friendships have
been built up or were destroyed in the short time interval between unemployment entry
and interview date. With respect to the information on colleagues, we use the frequency
of contact to colleagues before the individuals entered unemployment. As this refers to
characteristics of the network that had been established before entry in unemployment it
is by deﬁnition unaltered during the unemployment spell.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
Table 2 shows that the individuals in our sample have about ﬁve close friends on av-
erage, whereas the frequency of contact to colleagues is more or less evenly distributed
across the diﬀerent categories, with slightly less observations in the group with the highest
contact frequency. We aggregate the information to reﬂect the individual’s degree of inter-
action with the respective social network and thus his potential access to valuable labor
market information. For both measures, we use a three-level scale, diﬀerentiating between
low, medium and high levels of the respective network indicator.10 In order to compare the
relative importance of the respective network indicators, we create an additional variable
that captures the nine diﬀerent combinations of low, medium, and high scalings for friends
and colleagues. This partition is insightful in that it provides evidence on the question of
whether the respective network indicators are additive in their eﬀects or if overlap exists
between the two groups that might lead to substitution eﬀects between both types. Table
2 shows that the most frequent combinations are having a medium number of friends and
a medium number of colleagues, with 26% of the total sample. The rest of the distribution
is symmetrical around the mean, with individuals being approximately equally likely to
have medium number of friends and a high (low) number of colleagues and the other way
round. Having extremely divergent combinations of friends and colleagues are the least
likely cases, with only 4% or 6%, respectively. This indicates that the factors inﬂuencing
network formation work in similar ways for diﬀerent types of networks, although individ-
uals might diﬀer with respect to their preference for the respective network types. For the
least likely case of a low number of friends and high contact frequency to colleagues we still
observe 306 individuals, i.e., each cell contains suﬃcient observations for an informative
investigation.
4.3 Search Behavior
The outcome of interest in our analysis is the individual job search behavior, represented
by the reservation wage, the choice of informal search channels and the search intensity
10We obtain the three-level scale by grouping together the middle values of a quartile-decomposition
of the friend distribution, and the middle-values of the four-level scale of contact-frequency, respectively.
Sensitivity checks of the regression results indicate that the low-medium-high scaling of the network variable
is not decisive for the results we obtain, it just serves the purpose of convenience.
10of formal search. The survey question regarding the use of particular search channels is
designed as a multiple choice answer, with individuals choosing one or more diﬀerent chan-
nels that were used since their entry into unemployment. Ten alternatives were oﬀered,
including informal search via relatives, friends and other contacts. Table 3 provides a de-
tailed listing of the options given. Contacting friends and acquaintances is one of the most
commonly used methods when searching for employment with 85% of individuals using it.
Other, similarly important sources of information are job advertisements in newspapers
and search via the internet. In order to measure search intensity devoted to formal search
we use the number of formal search channels used, a method proposed by Holzer (1988).
Table 3 shows that the unemployed use on average four formal search channels.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
In the analysis of substitution eﬀects between formal and informal search channels, it
is likely that some sources of information are considered more as substitutes to informal
channels than others. In order to identify the extent to which certain channels may be
considered as substitutes or independent to informal channels, we make the additional
distinction between active and passive formal search channels. We deﬁne active search
methods as those that individuals would consult if they wanted to solicit speciﬁc pre-
deﬁned types of jobs, rather than reacting to job opportunities that come up at random. A
similar distinction was made in earlier job search literature, e.g., by Kahn and Low (1988)
who diﬀerentiate between systematic and random search behavior. Systematic search is
thereby associated with a high degree of previous knowledge about ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage oﬀer
distributions and hence characterized by a high rate of job oﬀer acceptance. Random
search however, is used to generate information about the wage oﬀer distributions in the
market and the oﬀer acceptance rate is expected to be low. In our analysis, we allocate
posting advertisements in newspapers, direct applications at companies as well as using
private agents without agency vouchers to active search measures, as they are more likely
to be used by individuals who have a more deﬁnite idea about the type of jobs they want to
acquire. All other formal channels are deﬁned as passive search. Besides the fact that this
distinction groups channels that generate a similar speciﬁcity of job oﬀers, the grouping
is also valid in terms of search costs associated with the two groups. While the passive
search channels are rather inexpensive, the active search channels generally require higher
investment, both in time and money. From the descriptives it can be seen that the average
individual uses three passive measures, and only one active source of information.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 depicts the unconditional variation in job search behavior for the diﬀerent
categories of friends and former colleagues. Without controlling for any personal charac-
teristics, the use of informal search channels increases unambiguously with the extent of
the network indicator. However, it can be seen that using informal search channels is also
an attractive possibility for individuals with a low number of friends and a low frequency
of contact to colleagues. The most signiﬁcant diﬀerences in use seem to persist between
11low and medium levels of friends and colleagues, whereas an additional increase in net-
work size from medium to high does not seem to be correlated with changes in job search
behavior. For the other variables, the relations are not increasing with network strength.
The reservation wage is highest for the medium levels of the network indicators, the same
holds true for the search intensity invested in formal search channels. Hence, a descriptive
assessment of the relationship between networks and job search behavior seems to conﬁrm
that diﬀerences exist. The magnitude and direction of these diﬀerences need to be tested
in the empirical analysis controlling for individuals’ characteristics.
5 Estimation and Results
5.1 Empirical Strategy
In order to assess the impact of social networks on the job search process, we integrate








iµ + εi. (2)
Yi denotes the individual parameters of job search behavior, measured by reservation
wage, use of informal sources of information and number of formal search channels used,
in total and diﬀerentiated by active and passive search. Matrix Xi includes relevant socio-
demographic characteristics of the individual, extensive information of past labor market
experience, as well as further determinants of job search choices (compare Table 1 for a
detailed listing of the control variables). N1i and N2i are dummy variables, representing
the strength of the individual’s network. The network types considered here are the num-
ber of friends N1i as well as former contact frequency to colleagues from previous spells
of employment N2i (see our discussion in Section 4). Additionally, we include a set Zi of
observable personality traits as captured by the psychological measure of internal locus of
control and the individuals personality traits.11 By controlling for the individual’s person-
ality as, e.g., the degree of extraversion, neuroticism, etc., we are able to remove potential
bias in δ1 and δ2 arising from omitted personality traits that simultaneously aﬀect job
search behavior and the network formation. In particular, if we assume that these factors
aﬀect labor market success and network formation in the same way, neglecting them leads
to an upward bias in δ1 and δ2 and thus an overestimation of the eﬀects of networks in the
regressions for reservation wage. Furthermore, if individuals with a higher locus of control
tend to search more intensely while possessing a larger network of friends, as suggested by
Caliendo, Cobb-Clark, and Uhlendorﬀ (2009), we would get upwardly biased coeﬃcients in
the regression of formal search. If our model correctly predicts a reduction of formal search
however, omission of Zi would lead to an underestimation of the true eﬀect of networks.
In order to assess the magnitude and sign of the potential bias, we conduct the regression
with and without the Zi and compare the results.
11The personality traits included are similar to the ones used in the Five Factor Model, however we only
observe a subset of the 15 items used in this concept.
125.2 Results
Table 5 depicts the marginal eﬀects of the least squares regression analysis, incorporating
the low-medium-high scaled network indicators of friends and colleagues simultaneously.12
The upper part of the table displays the results of a regression model omitting information
on personality traits. Before turning to the analysis of the model with personality traits
let us start by looking at the general ﬁndings obtained by the former model.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
Column (1) depicts the eﬀects of an increase in the number of friends or the frequency
of contact to former colleagues on the use of informal search channels. We ﬁnd that the
magnitude of the eﬀect of a medium or high level of the network are very similar for both
network measures used, increasing the probability of using informal search channels by
about 5% on average, compared to individuals who have a low number of friends. These
ﬁndings conﬁrm the relevance of the networks indicators used in the analysis and show
that there exists a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the extent of the network,
and hence its productivity, and the use of informal search channels. The comparably low
magnitude of the eﬀect is to be interpreted in context of the relatively little variation
in the use of informal search channels (compare Table 4) as most of individuals with
low levels of networks also consult their contacts for job-information. Also, as this only
considers the extensive margin of informal search, it provides rather limited insight as to
whether individuals increase the intensity of informal search if they have a higher number
of friends or have have a more frequent contact to their former colleagues. Based on our
theoretical predictions in Section 2, we are able to deduce further insight from inspecting
the reservation wage and the intensity of search devoted to formal channels.
In the theoretical model, it is assumed that the productivity of informal search methods
is the only channel through which the network aﬀects the search process. As a consequence,
we expect that the search behavior of individuals who do not use informal search channels
is independent of their network size. In a ﬁrst approach, we therefore exclude those indi-
viduals in our sample who stated that they do not use informal sources of information.
This reduces the sample by 14%, which leaves us with a sample of about 6,750 individuals.
Further reference to this issue will be made in the sensitivity analysis in the next section.
Theory predicts that, in the case of substitutable or independent search channels, a
suﬃciently productive network will lead to a substitution from formal to informal channels
and thereby to an increase in the reservation wage. Columns (3) to (5) in Table 5 refer
to the eﬀects of networks on the intensive margin of formal search channels, measured
by the total number of search channels used. When considering the total sum of formal
search channels used in Column (3), the negative coeﬃcients indicate that an increase
in network measures does indeed lead to the predicted substitution eﬀect. The eﬀects
are strongest for a medium number of friends and a high contact frequency to former
colleagues, resulting in a reduction of formal search by about 1% (= δ1j/¯ Y ). However,
12We include all network indicators simultaneously, separate analyses do not change the results signiﬁ-
cantly.
13the eﬀects on the aggregate formal channel use are not statistically signiﬁcant. Splitting
up formal search into active and passive formal search however yields an improvement
in statistical and economic signiﬁcance. In particular, it can be seen that the decrease in
formal search intensity is mainly driven by the reduction of passive search channels. For
active search intensity, the regression coeﬃcients are predominantly positive, except for
a medium number of friends, but not statistically signiﬁcant. In summary, this suggests
that informal search is perceived as a substitute for formal search channels that generate
rather unspeciﬁc types of job oﬀers at a low cost. For a high number of friends we observe
a reduction of passive formal search eﬀort by 2% and for high frequency of contact to
colleagues by 2.6%. The results so far are in line with the predictions of our theoretical
model of job search depicted in Section 3. The model further predicts that, given the
productivity increase in informal search, an increase in networks should, ceteris paribus,
lead to an increase in reservation wages. Column (2) shows the eﬀect of the networks on
reservation wages. Indeed, we ﬁnd a small but signiﬁcant increase in reservation wages for
medium levels of the friends and medium and high contact frequency with colleagues of
about 1.7%.
Continuing the line of thought from Section 5.1, we now proceed to assessing the bias
arising from omitting personality traits in the above analysis. The lower part of Table 5
contains the same regression as above, with the inclusion of the personality traits. Com-
parison of the respective coeﬃcients in Column (1) shows that the inclusion of personality
traits does not aﬀect the results on the use of informal search channels signiﬁcantly for
either network indicator. However, when comparing the results in Column (2), we observe
a decrease in the eﬀects observed for the reservation wage. Compared to 1.7% in the previ-
ous analysis, we now observe an average increase of reservation wages of 1.3% for medium
levels of both network indicators. The signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients is furthermore re-
duced. This conﬁrms our hypothesis that certain personality traits aﬀect networks and
labor market outcomes in the same way, e.g, outgoing individuals are at the same time
more likely to have more friends and to be more successful in their career, resulting in
higher reservation wages.
For the case of the search intensity devoted to formal search channels in column (3),
we observe the opposite. While the negative eﬀect of networks on the search intensity
devoted to formal channels was rather small and insigniﬁcant in the upper part, they get
more pronounced and become signiﬁcant when including personality traits. In particular,
we observe a 1.7%-reduction in the aggregate number of formal search channels for high
numbers of close friends and a 2% decrease for a high frequency of contact to colleagues.
Once again, the coeﬃcients for passive formal search intensity in column (5) are even
stronger—here we observe a reduction of formal search at 2.6% and 3.3% for high levels of
the respective network indicators . The high responsiveness of these results to the inclusion
of personality traits underscores the problem of unobserved heterogeneity in the context of
analyzing social network eﬀects without any source of exogenous variation. Although the
overall model ﬁt does not increase signiﬁcantly by including these variables, the marked
change of the results in the expected directions indicates that personality traits have
an important eﬀect on job search choices as well as on the individuals’ network. In the
14following, we will consider the speciﬁcation with the inclusion of personality traits as our
preferred one.
In order to analyze whether there are additive eﬀects of the two network types and
to assess potential diﬀerences in the importance between the two groups, we include the
network combinations of number of close friends and contact frequency with former col-
leagues separately. Table 6 depicts the regression coeﬃcients obtained by interacting the
diﬀerent levels of the friends and colleagues indicator. In line with the previous discussion,
we focus our interpretation on coeﬃcients in the model with personality traits.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
Column (1) in Table 6 shows that the eﬀects on informal search are very much the same for
both types of measures used. Compared to the reference category of individuals with a low
number of friends and low previous frequency of contact to colleagues, an increase in one of
the network dimensions leads to a symmetrical increase of about 2% for medium levels and
5% for high levels of the respective indicator. A joint increase of both network indicators
leads to a further increase of the coeﬃcients to about 6%. In particular, we observe that
the eﬀect of a joint increase to medium levels is strictly larger than the sum of the one-
dimensional increase, from which we conclude that the two groups of social contacts are
additive and hence considered as two distinct sources of information if individuals have a
medium or low levels of the respective network. For the case of high levels of network, a
one dimensional increase to high levels has only a slightly lower eﬀect than a joint increase
to high levels, which implies that in this case the two groups are considered substitutes.
In terms of search intensity devoted to formal search channels, we again observe diﬀer-
ential eﬀects for active and passive search channels. Corresponding to the results in Table
5 we observe that the substitution of passive search increases with the respective network
level. In particular we ﬁnd the strongest eﬀects for the cases where either one or both
of the network indicators are high - here we ﬁnd a reduction of passive search between
4% and 5%. For the case of active search channels we now also seem to ﬁnd evidence
for a substitution eﬀect. Here, the largest reductions between 7% to 13% are observed
for individuals who have low-high combinations of the network indicators, or who have
a “balanced” network with a medium level for both indicators. In contrast to results on
passive search however, we do not observe a monotonous increase in network eﬀect. In
particular, the eﬀect is increasing only for a one-dimensional raise in either network type,
but disappears again for joint high or medium levels of the respective network indicators.
In terms of the reservation wage we ﬁnd the eﬀects are strongest for individuals with a
“balanced” network, i.e., where network indicators are both medium or both high. Com-
pared to individuals with a low total network, we observe an increase of the reservation
wage of about 3%. 13
In summary it can be stated, that our model predictions are largely conﬁrmed by
the empirical analysis. First, we are able to conﬁrm the relevance of our chosen network
13The eﬀects are not unambiguously increasing or decreasing in the network intensity, e.g., we do not
observe any signiﬁcant eﬀects on reservation wages for the medium-high and high-medium network levels.
However, most of the point estimates have the expected sign and are in line with our theoretical model.
15indicators as they are highly signiﬁcant in predicting the probability of using informal
search channels. As our theoretical framework derives predictions for search intensity on
the intensive margin, we proceed by looking at the eﬀect of these network indicators on for-
mal search channels. The ﬁnding that individuals signiﬁcantly reduce their passive formal
search eﬀort as the network increases, is in line with the notion that passive formal and in-
formal channels are considered substitutes in terms of their productivity in generating job
oﬀers. Similar ﬁndings of search channel substitution were already invoked in the previous
literature, e.g., by van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006). Our analysis additionally es-
tablishes an explicit linkage between passive formal search and the size of the individuals’
network. As to the case of active formal search, we also ﬁnd substitution eﬀects, the overall
pattern of the results however seems not to be in agreement with our model’s predictions
of a monotonic relationship between networks and search choices. Within the framework of
Kahn and Low (1988) which distinguish between systematic (active) and random (passive)
search depending on the previous level of labor market information, our ﬁndings indicate
that the social network is used as source of random information that can be used to extend
the knowledge about labor market opportunities, rather than producing speciﬁc types of
oﬀers. In terms of the reservation wages, theory predicts that in the case of search channel
substitutability, reservation wages will increase. We are also able to observe this in the
data although the size of this eﬀect is rather small. This was to be expected however, as
it is generally found that informal search channels lead to an increase in the exit rate out
of unemployment, which would be counterintuitive if the eﬀect of networks on reservation
wages is too strong.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We test the sensitivity of our results with respect to systematic variations of the estimation
sample. In order to assess the robustness of our model to the assumption that the use
of informal search channels is the only way by which networks inﬂuence the job search
process, we expand the sample to individuals who do not use informal search channels.
Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the corresponding regression results after the inclusion
of individuals that do not use informal channels. Overall, the results are quite stable. The
point estimates for the impact of networks on the use of formal search channels are lower,
but have the same sign. Similar to the previous results we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact on the
use of active search channels but a negative impact of high levels of our network indicators
on the use of passive formal search channels. Furthermore we ﬁnd that the impact on the
reservation wage is the same, indicating that networks might aﬀect the job oﬀer arrival
rate of individuals who do not actively search via their network.
Another point of interest centers around the question of whether the importance of
network information varies with the type of job searched. In Table A.2 we distinguish
between individuals searching for both, full-time and part-time employment, or part-time
employment only. As the expected income stream resulting from the type of job searched
is most likely to diﬀer between the two groups, individuals might diﬀer with respect to
their search behavior. In particular, as the expected return from part-time work is lower
16than from full-time work, it could be that individuals search less intensely, as e.g. found
by Weber and Mahringer (2008), and are hence more likely to rely on less costly search
methods. We ﬁnd that the results obtained in the main analysis only persist for individuals
searching for full-time work or both types of jobs. However, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect
of networks on the search choices of individuals looking for part-time work only. These
results seem to indicate that the reasoning of our model does not apply to this subgroup of
unemployed workers. As this group is characterized by a predominant share of women, we
further investigate the sensitivity of our previous results to gender eﬀects. Stratiﬁcation
of the regression analysis, however does not provide evidence for diﬀerential eﬀect on the
job search behavior of men and women. Thus, the question why part-time workers diﬀer
in their behavior needs further investigation.
As a further sensitivity test we assess the dependence of our results on the estimation
method used. In the previous analysis the regression coeﬃcients on search intensity were
obtained by least squares regression analysis. However, given the non-normal distribution
of the number of search channels used, this might not have been appropriate. Therefore,
we also estimate poisson regressions that are more ﬁt to the properties of count data, and
obtain very similar results.14
6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the inﬂuence of social networks on job search behavior of un-
employed individuals. Using the extensive survey data on recently unemployed workers
in Germany collected in the IZA Evaluation Dataset, we test hypotheses derived from a
theoretical model of job search with two distinct search channels and endogenous search
eﬀort. In contrast to many previous studies, the data allow us to analyze the relationship
between social contacts and the job search behavior of unemployed individuals directly.
Our ﬁndings underscore the established importance of networks in the job search process.
In particular, we ﬁnd that individuals with larger networks substitute informal sources
of information for formal ones. We also ﬁnd that the substitution eﬀect is strongest for
formal search channels that are considered to generate job oﬀers with rather unspeciﬁc
job characteristics at lower costs. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that larger networks lead to
a statistically signiﬁcant increase in reservation wages of about 1%. Hence, our analysis
conﬁrms the wide-spread belief that social contacts constitute relevant sources of informa-
tion in the job search process. These results advance our understanding of the role that
the individual’s network plays in the process of job search.
However, our analysis relies on several assumptions that require further testing. For
instance, we assumed that the network indicators used are unchanged by the incidence
of unemployment. Given that further data points will be available in the data set in the
future we will be able to test the stability of networks with respect to labor market changes.
Also, a drawback of our data set is that we do not have qualitative information about the
networks, e.g., the share of friends having a job and the type of occupations they have.
14The regression results on diﬀerential and the poisson regression results are available from the authors
upon request.
17Exploring such information directly or approximating the quality of the network indirectly
by neighborhood characteristics would shed additional light on the relationship between
job search behavior and social networks.
Further research is needed to validate our ﬁndings in an analysis of subsequent labor
market success of the unemployed. For example, we expect that individuals who experi-
ence an increased productivity of search also leave unemployment earlier than otherwise
similar unemployed persons without relevant contacts. Furthermore we should ﬁnd that
the observed increase in reservation wages is translated into higher realized wages, irre-
spective of the successful search channel. Also, looking at realized outcomes should provide
insight into the (relative) eﬃciency of the diﬀerent types of job search channels. Since this
eﬃciency might diﬀer between speciﬁc types of individuals and jobs, it is also important
to investigate diﬀerential eﬀects, e.g., with respect to the skill level and previous wages of
the unemployed.
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Two (or more) Children 0.15
Socio-Demographic Age (years) 36.12
School Leaving Degree
None, Special needs, other 0.02
Lower Secondary School 0.30
Middle Secondary School 0.42
Specialized upper Secondary School 0.26
Vocational training
None 0.08
Internal or external professional training, others 0.72
Technical college or university degree 0.19
Regional unemployment in entry month 0.09
Last hourly wage earned 6.19
Unemployment Beneﬁt Recipient (yes) 0.81
Level of UB (missings=0) 545.11
Has been in Employment before, ever 0.88
Employment status before Unemployment
Employed 0.67
Previous Labor Subsidized Employment 0.07
Market Experience School, Apprentice, Military, etc. 0.14
Maternity Leave 0.05
Other 0.08
Termination of last job
did not have a job before 0.13
quit personally 0.10
laid-oﬀ by employer 0.72
other reasons 0.05
Share of adulthood spent in unemployment 0.06
Share of adulthood spent in employment 0.65
Internal Locus of Control 0.54
Personality traits:
I see myself as a person who (1: do not agree - 7: completely agree)
... does a thorough job. 6.45
... does things eﬃciently. 6.07
... is talkative. 5.83
Personality Traits ... is outgoing, sociable. 5.50
... is reserved. 3.86
... is original, comes up with new ideas. 5.22
... has an active imagination. 4.79
... worries often. 4.88
... gets nervous easily. 3.55
... is relaxed, handles stress well. 5.10
Searching for (Speciﬁcity) ...
a speciﬁc job opportunity 0.35
several diﬀerent job opportunities 0.54
any job opportunity 0.11
Other Determinants of Searching for (Type of Employment) ...
Job Search Choices a fulltime employment 0.69
a part time employment 0.15
full and part-time employment 0.16
Individual possesses a mobile phone (yes) 0.92
Individual has an internet connection (yes) 0.75
Individuals has an email account (yes) 0.72
Number of Observations 7,953
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations. 1The numbers are shares unless otherwise indicated.





Number of close friends outside family 7,953 4.83
Before UE contact with colleagues
never 2,349 0.30
infrequent contact 1,988 0.25
occasional contact 2,135 0.27
frequent contact 1,481 0.19
Coding in the Analysis
Number of close friends outside family
low (0-2) 2,169 0.27
medium (3-5) 3,991 0.50
high (more than 5) 1,793 0.23














Correlation coeﬃcient between the coded indicators 0.07***
Number of Observations 7,953
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
1 The numbers are shares, unless otherwise indicated.
22Table 3: Job Search Behavior of the Unemployed
Variable Shares
1
Hourly reservation Wage (in Euro) 7.03
median [6.60]
s.d. (2.29)
Use of informal search channel 0.85
Use of formal search channels:
advertisements in a newspaper 0.84
posting an advertisement myself 0.14
using the job information system (SIS) 0.60
contacting an agent of the unemployment agency 0.70
research on the internet 0.86
contacting a private agent with agency voucher 0.09
contacting a private agent without agency voucher 0.16
direct application at companies 0.67
others 0.19








2 formal search channels used 3.29
median [3.00]
s.d. (1.19)
Number of Observations 7,953
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
1 The numbers are shares unless indicated otherwise.
2 Posting an advertisement oneself, contacting a private agent without
voucher, and direct application at companies are considered active
search. The rest of the formal search channels is considered passive
search.
Table 4: Job Search Behavior by Network Indicator
Outcome Frequency p-values of t-test
low medium high l-m l-h m-h
By number of close friends
Hourly reservation Wage (in Euro) 6.87 7.11 7.03 0.00 0.03 0.21
Informal search 0.81 0.86 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.43
Number of formal Search Channels used 4.23 4.28 4.22 0.28 0.78 0.18
Number of active formal Search Channels used 0.95 0.95 1.01 0.85 0.01 0.01
Number of passive formal Search Channels used 3.28 3.32 3.21 0.19 0.06 0.00
Observations 2,169 3,991 1,793
By former contact frequency to colleagues
Hourly reservation Wage (in Euro) 6.68 7.19 7.13 0.00 0.00 0.43
Informal search 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.07
Number of formal Search Channels used 4.19 4.30 4.22 0.01 0.63 0.09
Number of active formal Search Channels used 0.93 0.97 1.00 0.07 0.01 0.15
Number of passive formal Search Channels used 3.26 3.33 3.22 0.02 0.31 0.00
Number of Observations 2,349 4,123 1,481
Source: IZA Evaluation Data Set, own calculations.
Note: The numbers are shares, unless otherwise indicated. The p-value refers to a two-sided t-test of mean
equality between the groups.
23Table 5: Eﬀect of Friends and Colleagues on the Use of Informal Search Channels
and other Job Search Behavior, using only Individuals who use both, Formal AND
Informal Channels.
Informal Reservation Formal Active Passive
Search Wage search channels formal search formal search
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Personality Traits
Number of close friends outside family (ref. low)
medium 0.042
∗∗∗ 0.017
∗∗ -.049 -.027 -.022
(0.009) (0.007) (0.045) (0.022) (0.034)
high 0.051
∗∗∗ 0.009 -.018 0.037 -.055
(0.009) (0.008) (0.055) (0.026) (0.042)
Before UE contact frequency with colleagues (ref: low)
medium 0.032
∗∗∗ 0.017
∗∗ 0.015 0.015 -.0006
(0.01) (0.008) (0.05) (0.025) (0.038)
high 0.049
∗∗∗ 0.018
∗ -.046 0.041 -.087
∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.062) (0.03) (0.048)
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.037 0.413 0.061 0.028 0.065
Including Personality Traits





(0.009) (0.007) (0.045) (0.022) (0.034)
high 0.044
∗∗∗ 0.002 -.074 0.014 -.087
∗∗
(0.01) (0.008) (0.055) (0.026) (0.042)
Before UE contact frequency with colleagues (ref: low)
medium 0.03
∗∗∗ 0.013
∗ -.005 0.005 -.010
(0.01) (0.008) (0.05) (0.025) (0.038)
high 0.044
∗∗∗ 0.012 -.092 0.019 -.111
∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.062) (0.03) (0.048)
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.043 0.417 0.077 0.041 0.074
Observations 7,953 6,748 6,748 6,748 6,748
Unconditional Mean 4.378 1.003 3.375
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. All eﬀects are
marginal eﬀects. The coeﬃcients of informal search channel use are estimated using a logit, for the other
variables we conducted LS regressions. Poisson regression results for number of search channels used yielded
very similar results and are available from the authors upon request. Additional control variables used in the
estimation: Local UE Rate, standard socio-demographic characteristics, UB Recipient, Months in Unem-
ployment, Available communication, Employment Status before UE, Time of entry into UE. Furthermore,
the bottom regressions include measure for internal Locus of Control and personality traits.
24Table 6: Eﬀect of Friends and Colleagues on the Use of Informal Search Channels and
other Job Search Choices, using only Individuals who use both, Formal AND Informal
Search Channels.
Informal Reservation Formal Active Passive
Search Wage search channels formal search formal search
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interaction Friends and Colleagues (ref. Low-Low)
Medium-Low 0.026
∗∗ 0.009 -.119 -.102
∗∗ -.018






(0.014) (0.015) (0.1) (0.048) (0.077)
Low-Medium 0.021 0.011 -.073 -.073
∗ 0.0008






(0.012) (0.012) (0.075) (0.037) (0.058)
High-Medium 0.061
∗∗∗ 0.006 -.097 -.011 -.085











(0.012) (0.014) (0.09) (0.044) (0.069)
High-High 0.062
∗∗∗ 0.031
∗ -.165 0.009 -.175
∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.105) (0.051) (0.082)
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.044 0.417 0.078 0.042 0.074
Observations 7,953 6,748 6,748 6,748 6,748
Unconditional Mean 4.378 1.003 3.375
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. All eﬀects are
marginal eﬀects. The coeﬃcients of informal search channel use are estimated using a logit, for the other
variables we conducted LS regressions. Poisson regression results for number of search channels used yielded
very similar results and are available from the authors upon request. Additional control variables used
in the estimation: Local UE Rate, standard socio-demographic characteristics, UB Recipient, Months in
Unemployment, Available communication, Employment Status before UE, Time of entry into UE, a measure
for internal Locus of Control and personality traits.
25A Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis
Table A.1: Eﬀect of Friends and Colleagues on the Use of Informal Search Channels
and other Job Search Choices, including Individuals who do not use Informal Search
Channels.
Informal Reservation Formal Active Passive
Search Wage search channels formal search formal search
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of close friends outside family (ref. low)
medium 0.039
∗∗∗ 0.015
∗∗ -.004 -.011 0.007
(0.009) (0.006) (0.041) (0.02) (0.032)
high 0.044
∗∗∗ 0.004 -.037 0.024 -.061
(0.01) (0.008) (0.051) (0.024) (0.039)
Before UE contact frequency with colleagues (ref: low)
medium 0.03
∗∗∗ 0.013
∗ 0.011 0.011 -.0006
(0.01) (0.007) (0.047) (0.023) (0.036)
high 0.044
∗∗∗ 0.011 -.070 0.022 -.091
∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.058) (0.028) (0.045)
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.043 0.42 0.075 0.04 0.074
Observations 7,953 7,953 7,953 7,953 7,953
Unconditional Mean 4.253 .9652 3.288
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. All eﬀects are
marginal eﬀects. The coeﬃcients of informal search channel use are estimated using a logit, for the other
variables we conducted LS regressions. variables. Poisson regression results for number of search channels
used yielded very similar results and are available from the authors upon request. Additional control vari-
ables used in the estimation: Local UE Rate, standard socio-demographic characteristics, UB Recipient,
Months in Unemployment, Available communication, Employment Status before UE, Time of entry into
UE, the bottom regressions include measure for internal Locus of Control and personality traits.
26Table A.2: Eﬀect of friends and colleagues on the use of informal search channels and
other job search choices, stratiﬁed by type of employment searched.
Informal Reservation Formal Active Passive
Search Wage search channels formal search formal search
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Individual looking for fulltime or part-time employment
Number of close friends outside family (ref. low)
medium 0.04
∗∗∗ 0.013
∗ -.065 -.031 -.034
(0.01) (0.007) (0.049) (0.024) (0.038)
high 0.041
∗∗∗ 0.0002 -.084 0.016 -.101
∗∗
(0.01) (0.009) (0.06) (0.029) (0.046)
Before UE contact frequency with colleagues (ref: low)
medium 0.023
∗∗ 0.017
∗∗ -.012 0.004 -.016





(0.012) (0.01) (0.067) (0.033) (0.051)
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.045 0.443 0.012 0.01 0.01
Observations 6,768 5,746 5,746 5,746 5,746
Unconditional Mean 4.418 1.034 3.384
Individual looking for part-time employment only
Number of close friends outside family (ref. low)
medium 0.029 -.003 -.050 -.051 0.002
(0.022) (0.021) (0.106) (0.054) (0.082)
high 0.058
∗∗ 0.005 0.041 0.02 0.021
(0.023) (0.026) (0.139) (0.068) (0.106)
Before UE contact frequency with colleagues (ref: low)
medium 0.053
∗∗ -.0007 0.011 0.013 -.002
(0.025) (0.026) (0.123) (0.063) (0.096)
high 0.055
∗∗ -.004 0.128 0.08 0.048
(0.025) (0.031) (0.153) (0.078) (0.123)
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2 0.093 0.306 0.112 0.013 0.136
Observations 1,185 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002
Unconditional Mean 4.149 .824 3.244
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗/ ∗ ∗/∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%/5%/10%-level. All eﬀects are
marginal eﬀects. The coeﬃcients of informal search channel use are estimated using a logit, for the other
variables we conducted LS regressions. Poisson regression results for number of search channels used yielded
very similar results and are available from the authors upon request. Additional control variables used
in the estimation: Local UE Rate, standard socio-demographic characteristics, UB Recipient, Months in
Unemployment, Available communication, Employment Status before UE, Time of entry into UE, a measure
for internal Locus of Control and personality traits.
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